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One of the most  important questions about 
intelligence reform  after  the 9/11  attacks was 
whether the United States should establish  a 
new  domestic intelligence agency  – an 
American  equivalent  of the British  MI-5, 
some suggested. Supporters of the idea 
argued that  only  a  completely  new 
organization  would be able to provide the 
fresh  thinking  and strength  of focus that  was 
needed, and they  pointed out  that the US was 
the only  Western  country  without such  an 
organization. Critics said the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI)  was already  well on  its 
way  to reinventing itself as just  the sort  of 
intelligence-driven  agency  the country 
needed and that establishing  a  new  domestic 
intelligence agency  would require the 
creation  of a  costly  new  bureaucracy  to 
duplicate capabilities that already existed. 
That  debate was eventually  settled in the 
negative.   Although  a  number  of major 
reforms were made to American  intelligence 
– including,  most  notably,  the establishment 
of the position  of the Director  of National 
Intelligence (DNI) – no central domestic 
intelligence agency  has been  created.  Instead, 
the intelligence functions of the FBI have 
been  beefed up and several new  organizations 
have been created, including the National 
Counterterrorism  Center  (NCTC). Although 
occasionally  the argument  is still  heard that 
the US needs a  domestic intelligence service,1 
in  general most  intelligence professionals and 
outside observers appear  to agree that  no 
new  domestic intelligence organization  is 
necessary.  
But  this essay  argues that  even though  we 
as a  nation  decided not to establish  a 
domestic intelligence organization, we have 
in  recent years done just  that: we have 
created a vast domestic  intelligence 
establishment, one which  few  Americans 
understand and which  does not  receive the 
oversight and scrutiny  it  deserves.  There is 
good news here: this domestic intelligence 
system  appears to have been  successful in 
increasing security  within  the US,  as 
demonstrated by  numerous foiled terrorist 
plots and the lack  of another major  successful 
attack  on  American  soil since 9/11.  But there 
is also bad news: these gains are coming  at 
the cost of increasing domestic surveillance 
and at the risk of civil liberties. 
This essay  begins by  reviewing  the debate 
over  whether  a  domestic intelligence agency 
was needed after  9/11. It  then  describes the 
current system  of homeland security 
intelligence within  the US,  including  the 
growth  of new  intelligence organizations at 
the state and local  level,  and argues that  this 
constitutes a  de facto domestic  intelligence 
organization. Next  it  demonstrates that  the 
development of this domestic intelligence 
structure has moved the balance between 
security  and liberty  quite firmly  in  the 
direction of more security,  but  less liberty. 
The essay  concludes by  arguing  that even 
though  these developments might  very  well 
be acceptable to the American people, we 
cannot know  whether they  are acceptable or 
not without a  better-informed national 
discussion about domestic intelligence. 2   
THE DEBATE OVER A DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
One aspect  of the debate over  intelligence 
reform  following  the 9/11  attacks was the 
question  of whether the United States should 
establish  a  new  domestic intelligence agency. 
Although  the question  was often  framed in 
terms of whether the US should create an 
organization  modeled on the British  MI-5, 
several options were widely discussed.  
The change supported by  many  experts 
was to form  an  independent intelligence 
service within  the FBI. The FBI already  had 
the lead on  most  domestic intelligence issues 
and since 9/11  had been  increasing  its focus 
on  intelligence,  so forming  such  an 
organization  within  the FBI appeared to be 
the simplest  option,  involving  few  changes to 
the rest  of the intelligence community. A 
group of six  experienced intelligence and 
national security  experts, writing in  The 
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Economist,  argued for  this approach.3  The 
WMD Commission Report also supported 
such  a  change,  proposing that  the counter-
terrorism, counter- intel l igence,  and 
intelligence services of the FBI be combined 
to create a new National Security Service.4  
Critics,  however,  argued either  that  such  a 
change was unnecessary  because the FBI was 
a lready  transforming  i tse l f into an 
intelligence-driven  agency,  or  that  it  would be 
a  dangerous move because the  FBI was likely 
to remain  primarily  a  law  enforcement 
organization,  unsuited to the intelligence 
mission  and inclined to use its increasing 
intelligence and surveillance powers at  the 
risk of civil liberties.  
Another  idea  was to create a new 
intelligence agency  under  the newly  created 
Department of Homeland Security  (DHS). 
Federal  Judge Richard Posner, for  example, 
argued for  such  an  organization, to be called 
the Security  Intelligence Service, with  the 
head of this agency  to be dual-hatted as the 
DNI’s deputy for domestic intelligence.5  
The idea  that  was most  often  talked about 
was to create  a  wholly  new,  independent 
organization, possibly  modeled on  the British 
MI-5  (which  is officially  known  as the 
Security  Service). Supporters of the idea 
noted that most Western  countries have some 
sort  of domestic intelligence agency. In 
Britain MI-5  collects and analyzes domestic 
intelligence, but it has no police power or 
arrest  authority; foreign  intelligence in the 
British  system  is handled by  MI-6, the Secret 
Intelligence Service.6 Critics argued that  the 
MI-5  model was unlikely  to be applicable to 
the US because Britain  is a  much  smaller, 
more centralized country  with fewer  local 
police forces and a  powerful  Home Office, 
w h i l e  t h e U S i s m u c h l a r g e r  a n d 
decentralized, with  thousands of independent 
local police and sheriff’s departments.  
E x p e r t s a l s o e x a m i n e d d o m e s t i c 
intelligence models from  other  countries, 
including Australia, India,  France,  and 
Germany.7 Other  than  MI-5, the model most 
often  pointed to as appropriate for  the US 
was the Canadian  Security  Intelligence 
Service (CSIS). The CSIS was established 
relatively  recently  (1984), after the Canadian 
national police force (the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police) was found to have broken 
the law  and violated civil liberties in  dealing 
with  Quebec  separatist groups and other 
internal threats.8  
Support  for  a  new  domestic intelligence 
agency  was never  as strong  as it  had been  for 
o t h e r  m a j o r  r e f o r m s s u c h  a s t h e 
establishment  of a  Director  of National 
I n t e l l i g e n c e .  T h e 9 / 1 1  C o m m i s s i o n 
recommended against  creating  such a  new 
agency, and although  discussion  continues 
about  whether  or not the nation’s domestic 
inte l l igence structure is adequately 
organized,  there seems to be little impetus for 
setting up a US version of MI-5.9  
The most extensive study  of the question 
was conducted by  RAND, at  the request  of 
the Department  of Homeland Security,  and 
resulted in  three volumes of reports.10 RAND 
was specifically  not asked by  DHS to offer 
recommendations, but these reports can 
hardly  be seen  as ringing  endorsements for 
the idea  of a new  domestic  agency. When  the 
RAND researchers surveyed a  group of 
experts,  most expressed the view  that  the 
current organization for  domestic intelligence 
wasn’t very  good; but  they  also said they  did 
not think  that  any  reorganization  was likely 
to improve the situation.11 Gregory  Treverton 
summed up the study  this way: “Caution  and 
deliberations are the watchwords for  this 
study’s conclusions.” 12 
CURRENT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE 
ORGANIZATION  
In  its analysis for  DHS,  RAND outlined what 
i t cal led the “domestic  intel l igence 
enterprise.”13 This enterprise encompasses a 
c o m p l e x  s y s t e m  t h a t  i n c l u d e s 
counterterrorism  organizations led by  the 
NCTC; other  federal-level organizations and 
efforts, including those within  the FBI, DHS, 
and Department of Defense; and state,  local, 
and private sector  activities. Some of the 
experts consulted by  RAND saw  this 
domest ic inte l l igence enterpr ise as 
problematic  because it  was uncoordinated 
and thus potentially  ineffective; one 
described domestic intelligence as “a pickup 
ballgame without  a  real structure, leadership, 
management, or  output.” 14 But  even  though 
our  domestic  intelligence system  may  not 
have a  centralized structure,  it  is more 
coordinated and also more effective than 
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most Americans realize,  and constitutes a  de 
facto – but  little understood – domestic 
intelligence system.  
It is difficult, if not  impossible, for  the 
American  public to accurately  gauge the size 
of the country’s domestic intelligence effort. 
Much  of that  effort  is deservedly  kept secret, 
as is the overall  scope of America’s 
intelligence activities at home and abroad. 
The size of the national intelligence 
community  is not  precisely  known,  but  in 
2009  then-Director  of National  Intelligence 
Dennis Blair  described it  as a  200,000-
person, $75  billion  per  year  enterprise. 15 By 
the next  year  the intelligence budget had 
grown to $80.1  billion. That number  is 
believed to be twice what  it  was in  2001,  and 
it  is considerably  more than the $53  billion 
spent  on  the Department  of Homeland 
Security in 2010.16  
An  investigation into the country’s 
intelligence and counterterrorism  structure 
by  The Washington Post described what  it 
called “a  Top Secret  America  hidden  from 
public view  and lacking  in  thorough 
oversight.” 17  The Post found that some 
854,000  people hold top secret security 
clearances,  and that  at  least  263  government 
agencies and organizations had been  created 
or reorganized as a response to 9/11.   
The office  of the DNI is itself a  large entity, 
with  some 1,800 employees as of 2010,  and 
has come to be considered one of the 
seventeen  top-level agencies of the 
intelligence community.18  Within the 
Department of Homeland Security  there are 
at  least  nine separate intelligence elements, 
including  the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis and intelligence organizations of six 
separate DHS components: Customs and 
Border  Protection,  Immigration  and Customs 
Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration 
S e r v i c e s ,  T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  S e c u r i t y 
Administration, the  Coast  Guard,  and the 
Secret Service. 19  
Since 9/11  the FBI has greatly  increased 
the priority  it  gives to intelligence and 
counter-terrorism,  setting  up a new  National 
Security  Branch, increasing  the number  and 
status of its intelligence analysts,  and 
establishing  Field Intelligence Groups in  each 
of its fifty-six  field offices. The FBI has also 
been  busy  developing  new  networks of 
informants within  the United States: its 2008 
budget  request  said that  it  “recruits new  CHS 
[confidential human sources]  every  day,”  and 
needed more money  to do it,  with  apparently 
15,000 sources needing to be validated.20  
Some elements of national  and military 
intelligence have become more involved in 
domestic  surveillance since 9/11.  The 
National Security  Agency  (NSA),  for  example, 
which  was revealed in  2005  to have been 
involved in  what  was called the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program,  reportedly  continues 
to conduct a  significant amount of domestic 
intelligence collection. 21 As an  indication  of 
the growth  in  the NSA’s business – although 
presumably  much  of the growth is in foreign 
intelligence – the agency  is building  a  new 
data storage center in  Utah that  will 
reportedly  cost  $1.7  billion  and occupy  as 
much  as one million  square feet  of space, 
larger than the US Capitol building.  
Some domestic counterintelligence 
activities of the Department of Defense have 
drawn criticism  since 9/11,  in  particular  the 
now-defunct  Counterintelligence Field 
Activity  (CIFA). But  in  general,  military  and 
other  nat ional securi ty  inte l l igence 
capabi l i t ies have not  been  ut i l i zed 
domestically  to any  great degree,  because of 
civil liberties concerns as well  as Posse 
Comitatus restrictions on  the use of military 
personnel for  law  enforcement. For example, 
an  effort  to establish  a  National Applications 
Office  (NAO) to coordinate the domestic use 
of reconnaissance satellites failed after 
members of Congress opposed it. 22 And the 
US Northern  Command,  established after  the 
9/11  attacks to coordinate US military 
support  for  homeland defense and security, 
has been  careful  to focus most of its 
intelligence efforts toward homeland defense 
– focusing on  threats from  outside the US – 
and takes a  very  limited role in  domestic 
intelligence and surveillance (such  as helping 
to coordinate reconnaissance assets when 
needed to support  state and federal 
authorities following emergencies such  as the 
Gulf oil spill and Hurricane Katrina).    
Another  area  where military  capabilities 
have not seen  widespread domestic use is 
with  unmanned aerial  vehicles, or  UAV. 
Although  UAV  have become a  mainstay  of US 
military  operations overseas, they  are little 
used within  the US, even  by  civilian 
authorities.  United States Customs and 
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Border  Protection  does operate small 
numbers of UAV  along  the country’s northern 
and southern  borders,  and a  few  local  law 
enforcement agencies have experimented 
with  the technology, but they  remain  an 
underutilized capability.23     
A  growth  area  for  intelligence since 9/11 
has been  in  the development of national 
intel l igence centers, combining and 
coordinating efforts of a  wide variety  of 
organizations on specific  problems.  In  some 
cases these centers are new,  such  as the 
National Counterterrorism  Center  and the 
National  Counterproliferation Center.  In 
other cases already  existing  intelligence 
organizations have been  redesignated as 
national centers,  such  as the National 
Maritime Intelligence Center  at  Suitland, 
Maryland,  and the National Center  for 
Medical  Intelligence at Fort Detrick, 
Maryland.  
There are a  number  of other  new  or 
growing  federal intelligence agencies and 
organizations,  including  the El Paso 
Intelligence Center  (EPIC),  a  multi-agency 
counter  drug center  run  jointly  by  the DEA 
and DHS, and the interagency  National Gang 
Inte l l igence Center .  There are a lso 
operational  organizations that  are significant 
users of intelligence, including  the 106  FBI-
led Joint Terrorism  Task  Forces that  are 
critical tools in  combating domestic 
terrorism, and High  Intensity  Drug 
Trafficking  Area (HIDTA) Intelligence and 
Investigative Support  Centers,  which  are 
counter-drug  efforts sponsored by  the Office 
of National Drug  Control  Policy.24 There are 
also two Joint  Interagency  Task Forces 
(JIATFs),  one in  Hawaii and the other  in  Key 
West,  Florida,  which  are interagency  counter-
drug organizations nominally  under 
Department of Defense control.  
At the next  level down from  the federal 
level of intelligence is a network of seventy-
two state and local intelligence fusion 
centers. These centers receive DHS funding 
and support, and many  of them  have a DHS 
intelligence liaison  officer  assigned to them 
full time, providing  analytical  support  and 
reach-back  capability  to DHS headquarters. 
These fusion centers are not widely  known, 
but they  have had some notable successes in 
helping  to prevent terrorist  attacks and 
assisting law  enforcement  agencies in 
capturing criminals.25  
These fusion centers,  however,  have also 
generated controversy.26 The American  Civil 
Liberties Union argues that: 
The federal  government’s increasing efforts 
to formalize, standardize, and network 
these state, local, and regional  intelligence 
centers  – and plug  them directly  into the 
intelligence community’s Information 
Sharing Environment – are the functional 
equivalent of creating a  new national 
domestic intelligence agency  that deputizes 
a broad range of  personnel from all levels of 
government, the private sector, and the 
military to spy on their fellow Americans.27  
Bruce Fein, a  lawyer  and former federal 
official who is a  frequent government critic, 
testified before the House Homeland Security 
Committee  that the US “should abandon 
fusion  centers that engage 800,000  state  and 
local  law  enforcement officers in the business 
of gathering and sharing  allegedly  domestic 
or international terrorism intelligence.” 28   
The best  known  of these state and local 
organizations is actually  not  part  of the 
national fusion  center  network: the New  York 
Police Department’s intelligence division.29 
The NYPD intelligence effort includes liaison 
officers in  some eleven  countries overseas, 
analysts who reportedly  speak more 
languages than  can  be found in  the New  York 
office of the FBI, and even  a  program  that 
takes police recruits out of the police 
academy  and places them  in undercover 
positions, in  some cases conducting 
investigations inside mosques in  the New 
York City area. 30  
BALANCING SECURITY AND LIBERTY  
The 9/11  Commission  argued that  we should 
not have to trade security  for  liberty,  calling 
the choice  between the two a “false choice.” 31 
But  it seems that  the balance and the tradeoff 
are very  real  today.   There is nothing  new  in 
this: as a  RAND study  notes,  “Throughout US 
history,  in  times of national  security  crisis, 
civil  liberties have been curtailed in exchange 
for  perceived greater  security, the balance 
between  liberties and security  generally  being 
restored after  each  crisis.” 32  What is new 
today, ten years after  the 9/11  attacks,  is that 
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the balance has not  yet  been  restored, and in 
some ways the balance continues to shift 
toward greater governmental power.  
In  some cases,  this increased government 
authority  is obvious: more intrusive 
screening  at airports, for  example, continues 
the tilt  toward greater  security  at  the expense 
of liberty  (and occasionally,  dignity). In  other 
cases, the greater powers of government  are 
less evident. As an  example,  there is a  great 
deal of attention  paid today  to the previously 
little-known  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court  (FISC), which  is empowered to issue 
warrants for  domestic  searches and 
surveillance under  the Foreign Intelligence 
and Surveillance Act  (FISA).  But while fewer 
than  fifty  FISA  orders were issued in 2006, 
during  that same year the FBI issued more 
than  28,000  of what are called National 
Security  Letters (NSLs),  which  can  authorize 
search  or  surveillance of US persons but  do 
not require review  by  a  court or judge.33 In 
2010  the FBI made 24,287  NSL requests 
pertaining  to US persons,  but  only  1,579 
applications to the FISC for surveillance and 
search authority.34   
The FBI is expanding  its domestic 
intelligence and surveillance operations in 
other ways, as well. It  is changing its own 
internal rules to give its agents more leeway 
to conduct investigations and surveillance, 
such  as by  searching  databases or  sorting 
through  a  person’s trash. 35 And it appears to 
be making  greater  use of undercover 
informants in  intelligence investigations, 
leading  in  some cases to successful arrests 
and prosecut ions ,  but in others to 
controversy.36  
One of the most controversial  aspects of 
domestic  intelligence after  9/11  was the 
Patriot  Act, which  significantly  expanded the 
ability  of government  authorities to collect 
information  within  the US and lowered the 
“wall”  separating  criminal investigation from 
foreign  intelligence gathering. In  the years 
since it was first passed several  of the Patriot 
Act’s provisions have been  renewed,  adding 
tighter  controls of government  activity.  But  in 
general the government  has retained its 
increased authorities.  Several  of these 
provisions,  which  had been scheduled to 
“sunset,”  or  expire, were renewed in  May 
2011, with  the renewal receiving  as much 
attention  for  the way  it  happened – President 
Obama, who was in  Europe,  authorized the 
use of an  autopen  machine to sign  the bill 
into law  – as for  the fact  that  it  occurred at 
all. 37  
Because so much  of intelligence work – 
including domestic intelligence – needs to be 
hidden  from  view, a  considerable amount  of 
secrecy  might  be acceptable as long  as the 
American  public could be confident that  its 
legislators or  others were watching out  for 
the public.  As Gregory  Treverton  writes, “The 
public doesn’t  need to know  the details of 
what  is being  done in  its name.  It  does need 
to know  that  some body  independent of an 
administration  does know  and does 
a p p r o v e . ” 38  T h e p r o b l e m  i s t h a t 
Congressional oversight of intelligence 
matters is widely  regarded as weak, and 
much  of the day-to-day  supervision  of 
intelligence agencies is conducted by 
organizations such  as the National Security 
Council, the Office of Management  and 
Budget,  and agency  inspectors general. Such 
oversight is often useful, but  it still means the 
Executive Branch is supervising itself.  
Concerns over oversight of the national 
intelligence community  are heightened when 
the focus shifts to state and local  intelligence 
efforts. Although  most  local fusion  centers 
receive federal funds and receive operating 
guidelines from  DHS and the Department of 
Justice, they  are under  state or  local control 
and as such  are not  subject  to any  strong, 
centralized oversight.  And programs such as 
the Nationwide Suspicious Activity  Reporting 
Initiative, which is being  implemented in 
cities and states around the country, show 
great  potential for  helping to prevent terrorist 
attacks and detect  other  criminal activity,  but 
they  also raise questions about  civil 
liberties.39  
Critics argue that in  the past ten  years the 
balance between  security  and liberty  his 
shifted far  too much  toward security, leading 
to a  great  increase in government power. In 
the words of Laura  Murphy  of the ACLU, “It 
feels as though scissors have cut  out  whole 
portions of our  liberties in  the name of 
fighting the war on  terrorism.” 40 This may  be 
an  overstatement, but  it does seem  clear  that 
the development  of a vast domestic 
intelligence structure since 9/11  has moved 
the balance quite firmly  in  the direction  of 
more security, and less liberty.  
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CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM 
HERE?  
By  its very  nature,  domestic  and homeland 
security  intelligence is intrusive and risks 
infringing  on civil  liberties. As then-Secretary 
of Homeland Security  Michael Chertoff put 
it: 
Intelligence, as  you know, is not only about 
spies and satellites. Intelligence is about  the 
thousands and thousands of  routine, 
everyday observations and activities. 
Surveillances, interactions – each of which 
may  be taken  in  isolation  as not a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y m e a n i n g f u l  p i e c e o f 
information, but when fused together, gives 
us a sense of  the patterns and the flow that 
really  is at the core of what  intelligence 
analysis is really about.41  
These thousands and thousands of 
observations are largely  observations about 
people and events in  America, and in  the 
years since 9/11  America  has created a 
domestic intelligence system  to collect them. 
In  some cases the people are  terrorists or 
other types of criminals,  and the intelligence 
collected has helped to prevent  bad events 
from  happening.  But  in  many  cases these 
observations, this intelligence, is about 
routine activities undertaken  by  ordinary 
Americans and others who do not intend to 
cause harm.    
Unless the threat situation  changes 
dramatically,  we are not  likely  to see a  new 
American domestic intelligence agency 
anytime soon. In  the place of an  “American 
MI-5,”  however,  a  huge and expensive 
domestic  intelligence system  has been 
constructed.  This system  has thus far 
succeeded in  keeping America  safer  than 
most experts would have predicted ten years 
ago, but  it  has also reduced civil liberties in 
w a y s t h a t  m a n y  A m e r i c a n s f a i l t o 
understand. Precisely  because it  was 
unplanned and is decentralized, this 
domestic intelligence system  has not  received 
the oversight  it  deserves. In  the long run, 
American  liberty  as well as security  will  gain 
from  a  fuller  discussion  of the benefits and 
risks of homeland security intelligence.  
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